Operation Vijay or the Kargil war, completes 20 years this month. Though not fitting in the classical definition of a full-scale war, the Kargil conflict was larger than the ongoing ‘Low-Intensity Conflict (LIC)’, in terms of the force level applied, the intensity and number of casualties on both sides in a short span of time. Having gained the military and moral victory over Pakistan by successfully evicting the intruders, the conflict left us with bitter and harsh lessons. We were caught off-guard when own foot patrols detected Pakistani intruders on own side of the border.
Intelligence failure and initial operational lethargy are cited as the main reasons. The Indian Armed Forces, however, rose to the occasion and proved their mettle, albeit at a higher price. The stories of the gallant action and supreme sacrifice by officers are embedded in our minds forever. The end of the conflict is signified by Kargil Vijay Diwas, actual Vijay Diwas being December 16, signifying the Indian victory over Pakistani Forces in 1971 war. As the War completes two decades, besides celebrating the victory and honouring the sacrifices, it is equally important to review the lessons learnt from it.
Kargil War Review Committee gave its recommendations for short, medium and long term measures to be adopted at the National and Tri-Services level to prevent a repeat. Sadly, the action on the recommendations falls short in terms of intent, pace and extent. The geopolitical fallout of not addressing the recommendations is visible with China making inroads into neighbouring countries, especially in the military domain. The remedies are costly but so is the nation’s security.
What do we need?
Aggressive Mindset: The surgical strike post-Uri attack and the airstrikes at the terrorist camps in Balakot, deep inside the Pakistan territory are examples of an aggressive shift in the policy. However, both these operations were reactive in nature. Pakistan still holds the key to escalate things on the Line Of Control and even hinterland. The Indian will to cross the Line Of Control and International Border has not been displayed as a stated policy. Pakistan and the terrorist organisations take this defensive mindset as weakness and keep testing the patience of the Indian government and the security forces time and again. Unless we change our mindset and raise the cost of war for the enemy, things are not likely to change.
Strong, Seamless and Foolproof Intelligence Network: Several empowered and well-equipped intelligence agencies have been conceived post the conflict and they are doing a commendable job too but in their respective silos. The integration of human, electronic, cyber, aerial and space-based intelligence assets is still a distant dream. The attack on the Army camp in Uri as also the Pulwama suicide bombing are examples of the gaps in the intelligence set up. Unification and integration of capabilities is the only way ahead.
Jointmanship: Though the ground battle in 1999 was predominantly fought by Army, the IAF played a crucial role of hitting the enemy deep, cutting off his frontline forces as well as by providing secure skies. The Air Force was also the backbone of heavy logistics as well as strategic troop movement from other areas. The Navy too had moved the Western and Eastern fleets in the Arabian Sea to block and if required, attack Pakistani Navy and ports. Kargil war, once again, highlighted the importance of tri-service coordination as a battle winning factor. We are still struggling with the idea of Joint Theatre Commands, Andaman and Nicobar Command being the only one till date. Also, the appointment of Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) is still Adhoc and the strategic planning for three services is largely handled by MoD bureaucrats, which is not the best option.
Operational Preparedness: We were half prepared in 1999. It was the will of the soldiers that won the war. During this period, we have raised a Mountain Strike Corps, pushed up tanks in the frozen plains as also the reorganisation of the strike elements as Integrated Battle Groups is under process. But the modernisation of war-waging equipment purchase of crucial hardware in terms of naval assets, aircraft, artillery pieces, tanks and air defence systems besides an array of other state-of-the-art stuff for combat support arms and services suffers from bureaucratic delays and political short-sightedness. The budgetary allocation for defence falls short to meet the requirement, that too when China-Pak collusively in future conflict is almost certain. The question is, Are we prepared to take on a battle on Two and a Half Fronts?
Defence Procurement: The process suffers from slow pace and system’s apathy, besides being marred in controversies. We need to simplify the process and re-draw the priority list to be in sync with the regional challenges. ‘Make in India’ is a good concept and the recent announcement by the Defence Ministry of giving equal opportunity to private players in defence manufacturing is a welcome step. However, everything comes with a time penalty. Both Navy and Air Force need major resource injection to be able to perform their primary tasks.
Upgraded Infantryman: Battle in the mountains will ultimately be fought by the man on the ground. For this, we need a well equipped and technologically updated infantry, capable of adapting to the ever changing battlefield environment. We have been working on the Fourth Generation Soldier for almost a decade. It is now that the government is planning to change the basic rifle to indigenously made AK-203. Honestly, except imaging and communication equipment, the infantryman remains the same as that of 1999. The morale of the soldier is a crucial battle winning factor. Sadly, over the decades, issues like pay and options for the second career of soldiers have not been given due attention. Cases like ‘One Rank One Pension’ remain unresolved, adversely affecting the morale of serving soldiers.
The Information War: In Kargil conflict, we emerged winners in the information domain. We won the ‘media battle’ and the world believed our side of the story. The war was beamed into our drawing rooms and Pakistan had no option but to give in. It was the opinion generated by the information warriors that the conflict did not escalate to the nuclear threshold. The conflict zone was restricted as there was no third party interference. Captain Vikram Batra’s ‘Ye Dil Maange More’ became the war anthem. The favourable world opinion forced Pakistan to withdraw. But in the following years, we seem to have lost the ‘information edge’. Neglect of this crucial facet has led to losing the media battle during the Balakot strike. Pakistan was able to confuse the world about the missing F16 and its dead pilot. The Pakistani propaganda about the failure of the Indian Mission in Balakot had many takers.
Our response came too late and too mild. The aftermath of Burhan Wani’s death was mainly due to our poor understanding of the power of social media. A strong case needs to be built for the people of J&K, especially of the Kashmir Valley, who are still under the spell of adversary’s propaganda. We need to incorporate and empower information warfare components like cyber warriors, media and perception management teams in all kind of operational engagements. Army has announced the raising of Directorate General of Information Warfare (DG IW) as a separate entity. Along with this, the dated media and cyber warfare policies too need an upgrade. It is time that we hired domain specialists which may not even fit in the classical definition of a soldier.
An honest tribute to our gallant soldiers will be when the nation rises to the current challenges. We have a strong government and all these steps that are needed to avoid a Kargil like situation in the future can be sped up by decisive actions taken now. We must display a clear change in mindset. We are already 20 years too late. Ye Dil ‘Still’ Maange More.
(Col Amardeep Singh has seen active service in J&K, has been an instructor at The Infantry School Mhow, Indian Military Academy, Dehradun and Army War College Mhow)
